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Decision-making is often viewed as a two-stage process, where subjective values are first assigned to each option and then the option of
the highest value is selected. Converging evidence suggests that these subjective values are represented in the striatum and medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC). A separate line of evidence suggests that activation in the same areas represents the values of rewards even
when choice is not required, as in classical conditioning tasks. However, it is unclear whether the same neural mechanism is engaged in
both cases. To address this question we measured brain activation with functional magnetic resonance imaging while human subjects
passively viewed individual consumer goods. We then sampled activation from predefined regions of interest and used it to predict
subsequent choices between the same itemsmadeoutsideof the scanner.Our results show that activation in the striatumandMPFC in the
absence of choice predicts subsequent choices, suggesting that these brain areas represent value in a similar manner whether or not
choice is required.
Introduction
The choice process is typically viewed as a two-stage mechanism
in which values are first assigned to each option and then com-
pared to yield choice (Glimcher, 2009; Kable and Glimcher,
2009). Converging evidence suggests that these values are stored
in the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and are
subsequently used by circuits in the lateral prefrontal and parietal
cortices to guide choice (Kable and Glimcher, 2009). A separate
line of evidence suggests that activity in these areas represents the
values of rewards, evenwhen choice is not required, as in classical
conditioning tasks (O’Doherty, 2004; Knutson et al., 2005;
Tobler et al., 2006). While traditional economic theory would
partition these sets of findings (Samuelson, 1938), psychological
models of valuation and choice would suggest that a common
mechanism underlies these two sets of observations (Schultz,
2009). Does a single neural mechanism encode the value of op-
tions both when a choice between different options is required
and in the absence of choice?
The first step toward answering this question was taken by
Knutson et al. (2007). In their functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) experiment, subjects viewed a consumer good,
then viewed its price, and then chose whether to purchase the
good. Striatal activity during the product presentation andMPFC
activity during the price presentation predicted subsequent pur-
chase decisions. These activations, however, were taking place in
the context of a choice: subjects knew they would have to choose
whether to purchase the item, and made their decision just a few
seconds after viewing the good and its price. While these results
provided strong evidence for the representation of subjective
value in the striatum and MPFC during the choice process, they
leave open the possibility that a different neural mechanism is
engaged in the representation of value when choice is not
required.
Lebreton et al. (2009) extended this finding to test the inde-
pendence of choice and non-choice valuations directly. In their
study, subjects first viewed images of faces, houses, and paintings
in the scanner, while rating either their pleasantness or their age,
and then made choices about pairs of the same items outside of
the scanner. Parts of the striatum and MPFC were more active
during both rating tasks for images that were subsequently cho-
sen as more pleasant, suggesting that some type of valuation pro-
cesses may indeed automatically occur in these areas.
The choices subjects made outside of the scanner in the Leb-
reton study, however, assessed the visual pleasantness of the im-
ages: by choosing, subjects indicated which image in a pair they
experienced as more pleasant, not which item they would like to
have. Here we extend this finding to the economic domain of
consequential consumer choice, by determining whether activity
in the striatum and MPFC during passive viewing can be used to
predict the consumer goods that a subject will later choose.
To address this question, we used a simple non-choice lottery
task to independently localize value-related areas in the striatum
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andMPFC,where activation increases as value increases. Subjects
then viewed images of individual goods in the scanner. Finally,
outside of the scanner subjects made choices between all pairwise
combinations of the same goods. If the striatum and MPFC rep-
resent the subjective value of consumer goods both during pas-
sive viewing of goods and during economic choice, then
activation in these areas measured during passive viewing should
allow us to predict subsequent choices. Furthermore, a whole-
brain analysis using the preference rankings obtained outside of
the scanner should also reveal significant activation in the stria-
tum and MPFC.
Materials andMethods
Subjects
Twelve healthy right-handed adults (7 females;mean age, 26.33 years; age
range, 18–34 years), with normal or corrected to normal vision partici-
pated in this study. All subjects gave written informed consent to partic-
ipate and the experimental paradigm was approved by the University
Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects and was in compli-
ance with the safety guidelines forMRI research. Subjects participated in
two separate scanning sessions, one for the functional localizer and one
for the goods task, and received a show-up fee of $25/h plus earnings
based on the experiment, as detailed below. In each session, subjects were
instructed in the task and tested for task comprehension before entering
the scanner.
Tasks
Functional localizer task. To functionally localize value-related areas with
as few prior assumptions as possible we used a non-choice task in which
subjects win and lose money. This is similar to methods used to identify
dopaminergic neurons used in electrophysiological experiments, which
are based on the dopamine response to unex-
pected rewards (Schultz et al., 1997), and as-
sumes that a value-related area will exhibit a
response that increases as value increases. The
experimental design was similar to the one de-
veloped byCaplin et al. (2010), except that only
a single lottery appeared on each trial and sub-
jects were not required to make any choices.
Immediately before the scanning session, sub-
jects received an endowment of $40 that they
were instructed to put in their pocket as they
would be playing a lottery “game” with this
money. The subjects were told that if they won
more money over the course of the game, they
would be given those winnings when the scan
ended. If they lost anymoney during the game,
they would have to return it to the experi-
menter and could keep the rest of the $40. If at
any point during the game they lost all $40, the
gamewould end and they would have to return
all of the money. Each subject completed 128
trials of 8 s each in 2 scans. Each trial beganwith
a 2 s fixation cross. Then a lottery represented
by a pie chart appeared for 1 s. The lottery was
always equal probabilities of winning or losing
$2. To keep subjects alert, subjects were in-
structed to press a button during the 1 s lottery
presentation. Following the button press, there
was a 3 s delay period in which the lottery re-
mained on the screen.Next, the outcome of the
lottery was revealed for 2 s by a change in color
of that outcome in the pie chart (Fig. 1). If
subjects did not press a button within the 1 s
time limit, the trial ended and the subject re-
ceived a penalty of losing $2.
Goods task. Subjects completed six scans of
the goods task, each consisting of 41 trials. The
first trial of each scan simply presented an im-
age of a consumer DVD movie cover. This trial was used to capture the
initial burst of activation at the beginning of a scan and all data from each
of these first trials were discarded. In each of the next 40 trials presented
during each scan, subjects passively viewed an image of one of 20 differ-
ent items including four DVD movies (Pan’s Labyrinth, Madagascar,
Dodgeball, and Dreamgirls), two books (A Thousand Splendid Suns by
Khaled Hosseini and The Road by Cormac McCarthy), four art posters
(paintings by Monet, Lileger, Klimt, and Dali), three music CDs (Kon-
victed by Akon, Beethoven’s Last Night by Trans-Siberian Orchestra, and
Come Away With Me by Norah Jones), two pieces of stationery (a calen-
dar/planner and aMoleskine notebook), and fivemonetary lotteries rep-
resented by pie charts. Each lottery offered a 50% chance of receiving a
designated amount ofmoney ($10, $15, $20, $25, $30) and a 50% chance
of receiving $0. Consumer goods were chosen based on a pilot study
which showed that the ranking of these objects by members of our sub-
ject pool was highly idiosyncratic (no subject who participated in the
pilot study participated in the experiment presented here). All itemswere
presented 12 times in a random order to each subject. Each item was
presented for 2 s followed by a fixation dot for 2 s (see Fig. 3a). Subjects
were instructed that when they saw an item they should think about how
much it was worth to them in a dollar amount. To keep subjects alert, on
20 random trials (one of the 12 presentations for each of the 20 items),
after the 2 s fixation, subjects were asked whether they preferred the item
they had just seen or a random amount of money (ranging from $1 to
$10). The response had to bemadewithin 1.5 s, andwas followed for 0.5 s
by feedback; either the word “item” or “money” depending on their
selection. If the subject did not respondwithin the 1.5 s, the feedback “no
response” was presented for 0.5 s. Subjects were told that one of these
question trials would be randomly selected at the end and they would
receive their selection on that trial—the item or themoney. Importantly,
these 20 question trials were used only to maintain subject alertness and
Figure1. Localization of value-related areaswith a functional localizer task: experimental design and activation in awin vs loss
contrast.
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were excluded from all further analysis. On all of the 220 other trials, the
fixation period was followed by the presentation of an “X” for 2 s, signal-
ing that no question would be asked on that trial. All trials were followed
by an 8 s period duringwhich a fixation dot was presented at the center of
the visual display. Importantly, during the scanning session subjects did
not know that they would subsequently be asked to choose between the
same items.
Behavioral choice task. Following the scanning session, subjects were
removed from the scanner and asked to perform a choice task on a
computer. Subjects made choices between all possible pairs of the items
(see Fig. 3b). Options were presented in randomorder and subjectsmade
a choice twice for each pair of items, with the items left-right flipped, for
a total of 380 choices. Subjects were told that one random choice trial
would be selected and they would receive whichever item they chose, so
they should pick the item that they “really want” on every trial. Following
the behavioral choice task, subjects completed a survey in which they saw
each item and answeredwhether or not they knewwhat the itemwas, and
whether or not they already owned the item.
Imaging
We used a 3-Tesla MRI scanner (Siemens Allegra head-only scanner) to
measure changes in blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) activity.
During each fMRI scan, a time series of volumes was acquired using a
T2*-weighted echoplanar imaging pulse sequence (repetition time, 2000
ms; echo time, 30 ms; flip angle, 75°; thirty-six 3 mm slices with no
interslice gap; in-plane resolution, 3  3 mm2; field of view, 192 mm).
Images were acquired using a custom radio frequency coil (NM-011
transmit head coil; Nova Medical Inc.). In addition, T1-weighted high-
resolution (1  1  1 mm3) anatomical images were acquired with a
magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo pulse sequence,
and used for volume-based statistical analysis. To minimize head move-
ment, subjects’ heads were stabilized with foam padding. Stimuli were
projected onto a screen at the back of the scanner, and subjects viewed
them through a mirror attached to the head coil.
Data analysis
Behavior. Subjects made all possible pairwise choices between the items
they saw in the scanner. Each choice pair was presented twice, resulting in
380 choices in total. A preference ranking of the 20 items was computed
for each subject based on the total number of times each itemwas chosen
by that subject. Thus an item which was chosen every time, against all
other possible prizes, would have been chosen 38 times and would nec-
essarily have a preference rank of 1. An item which was never chosen
during the 38 rounds in which it was offered would have a rank of 20.
fMRI. fMRI data were analyzed with the BrainVoyager QX software
package (Brain Innovation) and with additional in-house software writ-
ten in Matlab (MathWorks Inc.). Preprocessing of functional scans
included discarding the first 2 volumes, slice scan time correction, inter-
and intrasession three-dimensional motion correction and removal of
low frequencies up to 5 cycles per scan (linear trend removal and high
pass filtering). The images were then coregistered with each subject’s
high resolution anatomical scan, rotated into the anterior commissure–
posterior commissure plane, and normalized into Talairach space
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). For the multisubject analysis, the im-
ages were also spatially smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian filter.
Statisticalmaps. Statistical analysis was based on a general linearmodel
(Friston et al., 1995). The time course of activity of each voxel was mod-
eled as a sustained response during each trial, convolved with a standard
estimate of the hemodynamic impulse response function (Boynton et al.,
1996). For the functional localizer, the model included a predictor for
“win” outcomes and a predictor for “loss” outcomes. The model was
independently fit to each voxel activity time course, yielding two coeffi-
cients, one for wins and one for losses. The maps in Figure 1 highlight
voxels in which the win coefficient was significantly larger than the loss
coefficient in a multisubject random-effects analysis. For the goods task
the model included a dummy predictor for the first trial of each scan, a
dummy predictor for the presentation of each item and a parametric
predictor of the number of times each itemwas chosen in the choice task
outside of the scanner, normalized to a 0–1 range. The model was
independently fit to each voxel activity time course yielding three
coefficients for each voxel. The maps in supplemental Figure 2 (avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material) highlight voxels in
which the coefficient of the parametric predictor was significantly larger
than zero in amultisubject random-effects analysis. The threshold for the
random-effectsmaps was set at p 0.05 corrected for false discovery rate
(FDR) (Genovese et al., 2002) and a spatial extent of at least 100 mm3.
Region of interest analysis. The functional localizer was used to define
regions of interest (ROIs) within each individual subject, based on sig-
nificantly higher activation for wins compared to losses ( p  0.05 un-
corrected, spatial extent 100 mm3). ROIs were defined in the MPFC,
striatum, and occipital cortex for each subject. Note that these ROIs are
independent from the goods task and specific to each subject. Time series
for the goods task were extracted from each ROI of each subject, and
percentage signal change was computed in each time point compared to
the mean of the first point of the trial and the last two points of the
preceding ITI. Responses to repetitions of the same items (excluding
question trials) were first averaged and the percentage signal change at
time points 4 and 5 after cue onset (8–10 s after onset) were then aver-
aged together to yield the activation level used for the prediction of choice
(see Fig. 4), allowing time for the hemodynamic response. For supple-
mental Figure 3 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial), these responses were normalized to a 0–1 range within subjects and
averaged across subjects.
Prediction of choice.To predict choices in an unbiasedmanner we used
the BOLD responses to the items in the goods task that were sampled
from ROIs defined by the functional localizer as described above. For
each pair of items, activations for the two items were compared and the
item that gave rise to a higher activation level was predicted to be chosen.
Since there is noway to correctly predict indifference using this approach
(i.e., when a subject chose item A over B on the first repetition of the pair
and item B over A on the second repetition) we excluded those choice
pairs from further analysis. We then compared our predictions with the
subjects’ actual choices to determine prediction accuracy. Prediction ac-
curacies were also calculated separately for the subset of items that sub-
jects did not own, but were familiar with, and for the subset of items that
excluded the lotteries. Note that our use of the term “prediction” is
different from its use in multivariate studies (Haynes and Rees, 2006),
where the term specifically refers to the use of an independent set of data
to test the predictive power of pattern classifiers.
Finally, we separately calculated the prediction accuracy for pairs of
items based on their distance in order of neural activity ranking. After
ordering the items from highest to lowest neural activity magnitude and
then grouping the data by ordinal rank distance we calculated prediction
accuracy for all of the subsets of neural distances in our dataset. For
example, the largest distance in a given dataset would be 19: this would
compare the item with the highest neural activity with the item having
the lowest neural activity. The smallest distances would be the set of all
sequentially ranked pairs of items. The prediction accuracy between pairs
of items at all possible neural rank distances is plotted in Figure 5, in
Results.
Results
To test whether valuation areas represent value in a similar man-
ner during the choice process and in the absence of choice, we
identified value-related areas using an independent localizer,
sampled activations in these areas during viewing of goods in the
absence of choice, and then used these activations to predict sub-
sequent choices made outside of the scanner.
Independent localization of valuation areas
To localize value-related areas we used a simple lottery task that
did not involve choice. Each trial started with the presentation of
a lottery, signaling an equal chance of winning or losing $2. Fol-
lowing a short delay period, the outcome was revealed (Fig. 1,
top). A random-effects group analysis of the contrast between
120 • J. Neurosci., January 5, 2011 • 31(1):118–125 Levy et al. • Value-Related Activation in the Absence of Choice
win and loss outcome trials (n  12, p  0.05, FDR corrected)
revealed significant activation in theMPFC, the striatum, and the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Fig. 1, bottom). In single sub-
jects (Fig. 2) themost consistent results of the same contrast were
found in the MPFC (n  12, p  0.05,
uncorrected, spatial extent  100 mm3)
and the striatum (n  11, p  0.05) and
we therefore focused on these areas in
subsequent stages of the analysis. Note
that our localizer task was specifically de-
signed to not distinguish between out-
come values and reward prediction errors;
these two quantities are perfectly corre-
lated on each trial in our design. There-
fore, some of the observed activation
could have been specific to RPE rather
than to value per se. We use the term
“value-related areas” here in the broadest
sense, to include any area whose activa-
tion is higher for higher values. Impor-
tantly, the location of the activation foci
(MPFC, mean Talairach coordinates: x,
0 3; y, 48 10; z, 20 9, mean volume:
2000  1200 mm3, striatum, mean Ta-
lairach coordinates: x, 1 10; y, 7 4; z,
8  7, mean volume: 900  1000 mm3)
was similar to that reported in previous
studies in our lab for subjective value in
the context of choice (Kable and Glim-
cher, 2007; Levy et al., 2010).
Viewing of goods in the scanner in the
absence of choice
Subjects viewed images of 20 different
goods (CDs, DVDs, books, posters, sta-
tionary items, and 5 monetary lotteries)
in the scanner (Fig. 3a). Each item was
viewed 12 times. To maintain subject
alertness, on a few random trials (one rep-
etition of each item) they were asked to
choose between the presented item and an
unpredictable amount of money. One of
these trials was randomly selected at the
end of the experiment and subjects re-
ceived their choice on that trial. Those few
within-scanner question trials were ex-
cluded from further analysis. Subjects
were not told that they would later per-
form a choice task outside of the scanner.
Choices outside the scanner
Following removal from the scanner sub-
jects were asked to perform a choice task,
in which each item they had seen in the
scanner was paired with all other items,
and each pair was repeated twice. At the
end of the experiment one trial from the
choice task was also randomly selected
and subjects were given the item they had
chosen on that trial. Subjects were mostly
consistent in their choices, making the
same choice in repetitions of the same pair
(90  1% SD), and largely maintaining
transitivity (96  2% transitive triplets, i.e., triplets in which if
item A was preferred to item B and item B was preferred to item
C, itemAwas also preferred to itemC). To verify that the random
amounts of money used in the question trials in the scanner did
Figure 2. Localization of value-related areas with a functional localizer task in three example subjects (S1, S2, S3). Areas in the
MPFC and the striatum thatwere significantlymore active forwins than for losses in the functional localizer taskwere used as ROIs
in the main experiment.
Figure 3. Experimental design for the goods task.a, Passive viewing of items in the scanner (top). Tomaintain subjects’ alertness, on a few
randomtrials theywereasked tochoosebetweenthe itemandavaried sumofmoney (bottom). These trialswerenot included in theanalysis.b,
Outsideofthescanner,subjectswereaskedtomakepairwisechoicesbetweenthesameitemsthatwerepresentedtotheminthescanner.
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not bias subjects’ choices outside of the
scanner we computed the correlation be-
tween the amounts assigned to the differ-
ent items and the number of times each
item was chosen. There was no significant
correlation between the amount ofmoney
assigned to an item and the number of
times it was chosen. In fact, there was a
trend toward a correlation in the opposite
direction, such that items that were as-
signed higher amounts in the scanner
were chosen slightly less outside of the
scanner (r  0.36, p  0.06, n  20).
Since the lottery items were randomly as-
signed low amounts, but were often cho-
sen, we repeated the correlation
calculation without the lotteries, and ob-
tained a completely insignificant level of
correlation (r  0.16, p  0.3, n  15)
demonstrating that the price an item was
offered at did not affect subsequent
choice. The choices made by each subject
were used to infer his or her preference
ranking for the items. These rankings were highly idiosyncratic
across subjects (supplemental Fig. 1, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material) such that the individual prefer-
ences of a given subject could not be predicted from preferences
exhibited by other subjects (mean correlation of ranking between
pairs of subjects, excluding lotteries: r 0.1 0.3).
Regression-based analysis
We first searched globally for brain areas whose BOLD activation
during the passive viewing was correlated with the preference
ranking inferred from the choices made outside of the scanner. A
random-effects group analysis (n 12, p 0.05, FDR corrected)
revealed significant correlation in regions of the striatum,MPFC,
PCC, posterior superior temporal sulcus extending to the in-
traparietal sulcus,middle frontal gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus
(supplemental Fig. 2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mentalmaterial), all areas that have been implicated before in the
representation of subjective value with (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Levy et
al., 2010) and without (O’Doherty et al., 2002; O’Doherty, 2004;
Knutson et al., 2005) choice. We next turned to the ROI analysis
to directly test whether activity measured from independently
localized areas is correlated with subsequent choices.
Goods activation in ROIs
Using the localizer task we identified ROIs in the MPFC and the
striatumwithin each subject (Fig. 2) and sampled their activation
during the passive viewing of goods. Repeated responses to each
item were then averaged within each ROI within each subject,
excluding those trials in which subjects were asked to make a
choice between the item and an amount of money. The mean
BOLD responses were then correlated with the preference rank-
ing computed as the number of times each itemwas chosen in the
choice task (Fig. 4). Positive correlations were obtained in most
subjects (9/12 in theMPFC and 9/11 in the striatum) and a Fisher
transformation showed that the level of correlation was signifi-
cant across subjects (MPFC: r  0.18, p  0.05; striatum: r 
0.18, p  0.01). Significant correlation was also found when
choices from all subjects were aggregated (MPFC: r 0.17, p
0.01; striatum: r 0.16, p 0.05). Similarly, significant correla-
tion was observed when normalized activation to items of the
same ranking was averaged across subjects and correlated with
the ranking (MPFC: r  0.49, p  0.05; striatum: r  0.50, p 
0.05; supplemental Fig. 3, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material).
The observed correlations might have been a result of a gen-
eral arousal effect, in which more preferred items elicited higher
arousal and therefore higher general brain activation. To test
whether the effect was specific to these hypothesized value-
related areas we therefore used the localizer to define an addi-
tional ROI in the occipital cortex (in the vicinity of the primary
visual cortex). Note that only voxels that showed significantly
higher activation for wins compared to losses in the localizer task
were included in the definition of the occipital cortexROI. There-
fore, if the effects we observed in theMPFC and the striatumwere
due to a general arousal effect occurring throughout the brain, we
should expect a similar effect in the occipital ROI. This was not
the case: the correlation in this ROI was near zero (r 0.07, p
0.7, supplemental Fig. 3, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material). Although it is still possible that BOLD acti-
vation from other, non-value-related, areas is correlated with
subsequent choices due to some sort of arousal effect, it is clear
that those choices could not be predicted based on a general
arousal effect present throughout the brain.
Predicting choice
To explicitly predict choice we used the activation sampled from
the value-related ROIs in each individual subject. Mean re-
sponses to the repetitions of each item were averaged and items
were ordered according to the level of neural activation. Predic-
tions of choices in pairwise comparisons were then made based
on a comparison of the responses to the different items. Figure 5
presents the percentages of correct predictions as a function of
the ordinal distance between the neural responses. As can be seen,
when activations aremost distant, the percentages of correct pre-
dictions are high both in theMPFC and in the striatum,with 83%
and 82% correct predictions, respectively, for the pairs that
yielded the most different activation in each subject. As activa-
tions became closer in ordinal distance, the percentages of correct
predictions decreased, but remained high for all pairs with an
activation rank distance of eight or more. Conversely, in the oc-
Figure 4. Examples of single-subject scatter plots of activation in the MPFC (top) and striatum (bottom) ROIs defined by the
functional localizer task for each of the 20 goods compared to the preference ranking of those goods obtained from choices made
outside of the scanner.
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cipital cortex prediction levels were around chance level for all
activation rank distances. The difference between the areas can be
clearly seen when all choices are pooled together (supplemental
Fig. 4, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
The overall prediction rate using activation from the MPFC was
56 3% (SEM across subjects), and a similar percentage of cor-
rect predictions was achieved using activation from the striatum
(55  2%) and combining the MPFC and the striatal activation
(56  3%). These percentages were significantly different from
chance in the striatum and in the combined ROI ( p  0.05,
1-tailed t test) and close to significance in the MPFC ( p 0.07),
while the percentage of correct predictions based on occipital
activation was not different from chance (50 3%, p 0.5).
Several factors could lead to a discrepancy between howmuch
subjects valued a certain item compared to other items and
whether they chose the same item over those other items. For
example, subjects may have already owned some of the items,
whichmight be interpreted tomean that they valued themhighly,
but would never choose them in the choice task. Similarly, other
items might have been completely unfamiliar to subjects, in
which case ambiguity about the goods might also make an anal-
ysis of value in the absence of choice problematic. To assess these
complicating factors, at the end of the experiment we asked sub-
jects to indicate for each itemwhether they owned it and whether
they had heard of it before the experiment. We then recalculated
the percentages of correct predictions, limiting our predictions to
choices between items that were familiar to subjects but not
owned by them (supplemental Fig. 4, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material). This had the effect of increasing
the accuracy of our predictions slightly (MPFC: 57  3%; stria-
tum: 58 3%; combined: 57 3%, p 0.05 for all ROIs). The
percentage of correct predictions based on occipital activation,
however, remained at chance level under these conditions (51
3%, p 0.4).
One final confounding factor we explored was the possibility
that the correct predictions we made were driven mainly by the
lotteries, whose ranking might be assumed to be identical across
subjects. We therefore recalculated the predictions excluding
pairs in which both items were lotteries. The prediction accuracy
was almost identical to the original accuracy (supplemental Fig.
4, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Discussion
Using fMRIwe show here that in the absence of active choice (the
kind that neoclassical economics posits is the only marker for
utility) the activity of two brain areas previously associated with
value representations, theMPFC and the striatum, can be used to
predict later consumer choices in individual subjects. This is a
finding which explicitly lies outside the domain of traditional
economic approaches, but which nonetheless can be related to
utility through choice.
Neural activations in predefined brain areas were measured
while subjects viewed 20 different goods inside the scanner. Im-
portantly, subjects did not make active choices during either the
functional localizer or the goods task, nor did they know that they
would later be asked to make such choices. The sampled activa-
tions were then used to construct an ordinal neural ranking of the
20 items. Subjects were next removed from the scanner and asked
to make all possible pairwise choices among the same goods.
These choices were used to create an ordinal choice preference
ranking of the 20 items. These two sets of rankings, the neural
ranking and the behavioral ranking, were significantly correlated
in our subjects. Moreover, using the neural ranking to predict
each pairwise choice for each subject we found that prediction
accuracy increased as a function of the neural rank distance be-
tween the objects in the pair, peaking at above 80% correct for the
greatest neural rank distance. Finally, the effect was specific to
value-related areas: activation measured from a region in occip-
ital cortex could not be used to predict choice. These results imply
that the same “subjective values” (Glimcher, 2009) that can be
deduced from choices are also generated in the absence of choice,
at least at the level of the BOLD signal, by the same neural mech-
anisms that are active during choice.
Value-related areas
Converging evidence suggests that the striatum and MPFC are
part of a general valuation system that represents value under
many different conditions. Activity in the striatum is correlated
with the magnitude of unexpected rewards and punishments
(Delgado et al., 2000; Kuhnen andKnutson, 2005), as well as with
the amount (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a, 2003), the
probability (Hsu et al., 2009), the expected value (Hsu et al., 2005;
Figure 5. Choice predictions based on activation from the predefined ROIs. Items were
ranked according to the amplitude of the BOLD response they gave rise to, and percentages of
correct predictions were calculated separately for each ordinal distance. Error bars, binomial
SEM across all choices.
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Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Luh-
mann et al., 2008) and the marginal utility (Pine et al., 2009) of
predicted outcomes, and may even reflect a form of reference
dependence (DeMartino et al., 2009). Similar findings have been
reported for the MPFC, which also responds to both receipt of
monetary reward (Knutson et al., 2001b, 2003; Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005) and expected rewards (McClure et al., 2004a),
correlating with the expected value of rewards (Knutson et al.,
2005). Finally, activity in the striatum and the MPFC has been
shown to track the discounted value of future rewards (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007) and the decision value of both risky and ambig-
uous expected rewards (Levy et al., 2010).
Other studies have shown that the striatum and MPFC also
represent the value of nonmonetary rewards. The striatum has
been shown to respond to the anticipation of primary rewards
(O’Doherty et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2007), as well as other
nonmonetary rewards (Sharot et al., 2009), and its activity re-
flects behavioral preferences, such as preferences for different
types of juice (O’Doherty et al., 2006) and meal pleasantness
ratings (Small et al., 2003). In a similar way, recent studies have
reported the overlapping representations of action-value and
stimulus-value in the MPFC (Gla¨scher et al., 2009) as well as an
overlapping representation of the value of different types of
goods (Chib et al., 2009), and the effect of subjectively weighted
decision factors on brain activation (Hare et al., 2009).
The value of consumer goods
The picture that emerges from all of these studies is of a unified
valuation system that represents the value of a wide range of
different objects, in different domains and under different con-
ditions. It is therefore reasonable to expect these areas to repre-
sent the value of different consumer goods. Indeed, activation in
theMPFC has been shown to be stronger for preferred compared
to nonpreferred brands of beer and coffee during choice (Deppe
et al., 2005), as well as for preferred types of cars in the absence of
choice (Erk et al., 2002). In a more recent study by Knutson et al.
(2007), subjects made explicit choices in the scanner and these
choices were then related to later ratings of the same items made
outside of the scanner. In that choice task, subjects first viewed an
image of a consumer good, followed by its price, and were then
asked to decide whether to purchase the good. Striatal activity
during the presentation of the product andMPFC activity during
the presentation of the price significantly predicted the subse-
quent purchase decisions, and striatal activations during choice
predicted later ratings of the products. Importantly, however, the
Knutson study measured neural activation while subjects were
making choices. The MPFC activation was recorded when all
the information for making the choice (product and price) was
already available to the subjects in a period immediately before
they expressed their choices by a key-press. The striatal activa-
tion, which predicted later ratings, was recorded when the price
was still unknown, but subjects knew that they would view a price
and make a choice in a few seconds, such that the activation
measurement was still done in the context of choice.
Value in the absence of choice
A recent study (Lebreton et al., 2009) was the first to directly link
activation in the absence of active choice to subsequent choices.
Subjects in this study were scanned while rating either the pleas-
antness or the age of faces, houses and paintings. Once outside of
the scanner, subjects were presented with pairs of the same im-
ages and asked to identify one of the two images as visually more
pleasant. By searching for brain areas that were more active for
images thatwere subsequently preferred compared to images that
were not preferred the authors identified regions in the striatum
and theMPFC. Interestingly, a similar result was reported in two
earlier studies that did not ask this question directly. In the first
study (McClure et al., 2004b) activation in theMPFC in response
to an unidentified squirt of Coke or Pepsi was correlated with
subjects’ taste preference as deduced from choices among unla-
beled soft drinks made outside the scanner. In the second study
(Berns et al., 2008) activation in a vast network of brain areas,
including regions in the MPFC and the striatum, during expec-
tation of aversive outcomes predicted subsequent choices be-
tween the same outcomes. These results suggest that at least the
valuation processes that are involved in pleasantness judgments
may indeed take place automatically in these areas, whether or
not those valuations are required for the task.
The present study extends these previous results by showing
that activation in the valuation areas in the absence of choice is
also correlatedwithmore complex,multidimensional valuations.
A consumer choice takes into account many factors, some of
which may have opposing effects on the final decision (e.g., a
pleasant music CDwith a visually unpleasant cover image or vice
versa). Moreover, a consumer choice carries practical conse-
quences for the decision-maker that a mere attractiveness prefer-
ence judgment does not. Our results suggest that automatic
valuations take place even in the absence of choice, and that the
same neural mechanisms are engaged by this representation
whether or not choice is made.
Finally, it should be noted that although previous studies have
clearly shown that areas in the MPFC and the striatum represent
the value of both experienced and anticipated outcomes, it is still
possible that these areas do not completely overlap. If this is the
case, then the accuracy of our choice predictions might slightly
improve if activity is sampled from the areas that represent the
value of anticipated, rather than experienced, outcomes, or if a
whole brain-based classifier analysis were performed. At the same
time, the drop in prediction accuracy, from 80% for the two
goods with the most divergent neural representations in the lo-
calized value-areas, to close to chance level for items with more
similar, although still distinct, neural activation profiles, suggests
fairly stringent bounds on the claims of neuromarketers.
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